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ABSTRACTS

Florin ANGHEL, *How to Build a Region: Some Geographies of Central Europe at the 1919 Peace Conference*

After World War I entirely Central Eastern Europe political establishment failed just because Allies principles victories together with the military, nationalist and propagandistic. Wilsonian leadership in 1918-1919 organized main structures of interests in the new states between Germany and Soviet Russia. Frontiers - as fundamental acts of the peacemakers in 1919 - became so important as it was in the past, part because the willing of alls to start as regional power, part in the direction to assure prestige, powerful politics between the neighbours and, last but not least, to reasume traditional/historical memories of the landscapes.

From Paris, together from London, it came three main pilons of organize borders of the new Central-Europe states: 1. adopting Wilsonian ideatic program (including selfdetermination and self-governance of the regions of failed empires); 2. adopting historical heritage in the new state establishment, including frontiers (for example, *Kresy*-Eastern Poland); 3. adopting strategic interests of the Great Allies (France, in main): for example, annexation of *Sudeten* region, native German, at the new Czechoslovak Republic).

Gavin BOWD, *Emmanuel de Martonne and the defense of Great Romania*

Recently, there has been considerable scholarly interest in the role of French geographer Emmanuel de Martonne (1873-1955) at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. After having established his international reputation thanks to works on the physical and human geography of Romania, de Martonne placed his knowledge at the service of the cause of Greater Romania, which he considered to be a natural ally of France. This article looks at the final stage of de Martonne's long relationship with Romania: firstly, as 'missionary' for France in post-war Romania, and in particular at the University of Cluj, then as a vocal opponent of both Hungarian revisionism and German geopolitics. Ironically, some of his Romanian disciples would be attracted by geopolitics in the context of the territorial changes before and during the Second World War. The article concludes with the eclipse of de Martonne and his disciples after the imposition of the Communist dictatorship and the end of Greater Romania.

Radu TUDORANCEA, *Bucharest Peace Conference and the Balkans' Frontiers*

This study aims at re-assessing an important moment in the history of the Balkan states, namely the Bucharest Peace Conference (1913), which ended the Second Balkan War. Without any doubt, the above mentioned event generated significant frontier changes in the Balkans, which reshaped the entire map of the region. With the war being over, the negotiations in Bucharest were, first of all, an expression of the new strategic situation on the war fronts, in which Bulgaria was defeated, and its diplomats were trying to limit the territorial losses.

Despite all the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Sofia, at the end of the conference Bulgaria was obviously the main loser, while the other Balkan statal entities have all (Serbia, Greece and Romania) achieved significant territorial gains, especially Serbia. Romania itself became an important power in the area, being perceived as a significant political player not only by the Balkan states, but also by the Great Powers.

Daniel CITIRIGĂ, *The Central-European federalism in interwar period*

The end of the World War One and the collapse of the Empires challenged the policies of new-born states from Central-South East Europe. This fact may be more clearly in Central Europe, where frontiers have considerably changed and minorities from new states cannot be neglected, neither as number nor significance.

In this context, the federalist idea was seen as a solution by a part of political elite. On one hand, we could observe a kind of *offensive federalism*, which aimed to rebuilt a *sacred territory* - as Jagellonian Poland or Saint Stephen Kingdom; on the other hand, a kind of *defensive federalism*, based on maintaining tradition and local values. In this last instance, the most obvious examples are the policies promoted by the Slovak People's Party and the Croatian Peasant Party.

Silviu MILOIU, *Sovereignty and Self-Determination in International Relations: Finland, League of Nations, and the Dispute over the Åland Islands, 1919-20*

This article undertakes an analysis of the historical and juridical argumentation brought to the fore by the Finnish experts in the case of the Finnish-Swedish litigation regarding the fate of the Åland Islands (1919-1920) and compares it to the position of the Åland Commission of Jurists. The empiric study uses the English language materials published in 1919-1920 by Finnish prominent historians and jurists as well as official papers elaborated by the Åland Commission of Jurists. One of the key findings of this article is that although the conception regarding the sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction was shared in by both the Finnish and international experts, the Commission's views (based mostly on one of its members, Max Huber's thinking) about the sociological basis of the international law as embodied in the concept of „transitional situation” to describe the situation of a new state emerging on the international arena generated heated debates and a swift reply from the part of Finnish historians and jurists.

Mioara ANTON, *The postwar planning of Great Britain for a new Central and Eastern Europe (1940-1945)*

The territorial issues of Central and Eastern Europe were at the heart of the tripartite negotiations. British diplomacy was deeply involved in planning the new postwar borders of Central and Eastern Europe. The Foreign Office favored the territorial reorganization of this

space through the establishment of confederated countries. But the British plans were blocked by the opposition of the Soviet Union. The strategic and security interests of the Soviet Union were incompatible with the existence of a federation in Central and Eastern Europe. The advance of Soviet armies in Central and Eastern Europe forced British diplomacy to give up the federal project and to concentrate on finding a compromise formula destined to limit the Soviet presence in Great Britain's sphere of interest. At the end of the war, the territorial changes to the map of Central and Eastern Europe were determined only by the strategic objectives of the Soviet Union.

Cosmin POPA, *The „Polish Question” or How the Plans Overcome the Soviet Planning on Borders*

Starting from the beginning of 1944 due to the military success on Eastern front the Soviet Union neglected the negotiations with Western Allies regarding the recognition of its strategic interests. From the Soviet point of view the military presence was more important favoring local arrangements with alternative political structures. The advance of the Red Army and the predictable occupation of Poland helped the Kremlin in trying to solve the complicated „Polish Question“, especially the problem of Soviet-Polish borders. Even from 1942 the Soviets consistently undermined the political initiatives of the Polish government in London, mainly the attempts to establish a strong Polish army.

Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, *Parents and Children: On predestination, awareness, and freedom*

It is not easy to make the difference between the biological family and the ideological one. For a son of former communist (or Nazi) ideologues it is very hard to talk about his father. But the persistence both in denying the evidence (that is, the crimes of communism) and in idealizing the relatives who embodied also totalitarian regimes could be describe as ill-fated subjectivity. In this paper the author analyzes the process of coming to terms with the totalitarian past through the eyes of the sons/daughters of the communist dignitaries involved in USSR and Eastern Europe politics.

Cristian VASILE, *Between Political Enrollment and Ideological Thaw: The Fine Arts during the 1950s*

In order to impose its cultural program for changing the structure of painters' and sculptors' creative association (UAP), the Propaganda and Agitation Department used both the avant-garde and the conservative artists. On the other hand, after 1948 in communist newspapers the Party exerted its ideological guidance, that is the spread of offences against reputable artists, including Constantin Brancusi, the great Romanian sculptor living in Paris.

The aim of this paper is to closely examine the relationship between Romanian artists and the political power, especially the ideological authorities of *Agitprop* in the 1950s, using archival documents from the Propaganda and Agitation Department preserved at the National Archives. One analysed both the legislative framework on visual arts, preeminently in painting and sculpture, and how the Fine Arts funding system worked during the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej regime. The entire network of royalties contributed to the obsequiousness of many painters, while the so called „Neo-Byzantine Realism” of some historical paintings was repudiated. Those artists who remained recalcitrant were purged mainly in 1958.

Gabriel Stelian MANEA, *An image success for Nicolae Ceausescu. The visit of president Richard Nixon in Bucharest, in August 1969*

Being consistent in our favorite field study of Romanian-American relations during the communist regime, we chose to investigate and highlight – to the extent of our modest possibilities – the benefits that Nicolae Ceausescu, particularly, and Romania, in general, had from the American President's visit, Richard Nixon, on 2-3 August 1969. We sought to identify the most relevant articles from two prestigious U.S. publications *Time* and *New York Times*, we tried to exploit two archival documents relating to the official talks of the two leaders, but also relating to a further meeting of Ceausescu with Leonid Brezhnev and we highlighted some references to this event in a memoir of Henry Kissinger. To a certain extent, we used the daily „Scinteia” and the weekly „Lumea”.

The visit of President Richard Nixon in Romania, on August 1969, caused very much interest in political and diplomatic circles in the media and the general public in Romania.

The aim of our paper is to demonstrate first that this visit represented a huge success for the personal image of Nicolae Ceausescu, as a leader who wanted to assert himself in the international arena, but also in the internal legitimacy of the Romanian adhesions to the leader's policies and initiatives from Bucharest. Beyond this gain of image – negligible at all – properly speaking, Ceausescu was unable for the moment to obtain what he proposed and asked Nixon during official talks, namely an increase in trade relations and granting the most favored nation clause.

Even during preliminaries of this visit when it was planned in the backstages of diplomacy, President Nixon saw this meeting as a modality to teach Soviets a lesson by visiting a country and a leader already known for an inappropriate attitude manifested towards Moscow's directives.

During the visit, Nixon enjoyed a receipt, attention and treatment that he will not soon forget and will not hesitate to remind them at every opportunity. He appreciated the warmth, hospitality and even enthusiasm with which he was received not only by Romanians, but even by Ceausescu and other leaders from the Romanian top hierarchy.

In formal discussions, the central part of the visit, there were approached some issues of common interest: bilateral political relations, economic cooperation, relations between U.S.A and China and the Vietnam War. The simple raising of these issues by Nixon – particularly the last two- confirmed that the image of Ceausescu – as an international leader who had personal and firm opinions that deserved to be taken into account- was improving.

Finally, international echoes of this visit have contributed greatly to shaping the image of a Romanian leader with personal and firm opinions who can't be influenced by other major power centers of the communist world, a leader who had a well defined aim to achieve in relations with USA.

Steliu LAMBRU, *Reflections on Romanian Prothocronism*

In Ceaușescu's Romania, Protochronism rised during the 1970s as one of the most powerful cultural trend, launched and disseminated by official intellectuals having the support of government. Considered a form of idiosyncratic nationalism, protochronism was responsible for increasing deterioration of cultural climate and contributed to the emergence and consolidation of Ceaușescu's personality cult.

On the contrary, this essay intends to explore the Soviet Marxism origins of protochronism indicating the main elements of it as constitutive parts of ideology: anticipation, prediction, and anteriority.