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**ABSTRACTS**

**Cosmin POPA**, *The Comintern, annex of the Soviet General Staff*

Established to expand revolution across the world, as affirmed its leaders, the Communist International during its entire existence was one unfulfilled promises, a predictable failure. Convened in Moscow, while the Petrograd seemed to be occupied by white and Finnish troops, the Third International for its initiators was rather an attempt to discipline European communist movement rather than a way to really export the revolution. The most important feature of the organization was, for the entire period of its existence, the inextricable link ideological, organizational and material, including financial, with PCS (b) and the USSR. This has not only made its mark on the structure and organization, but also political projects developed by him into dependence on Russian foreign policy taking place rapidly in the first years of its existence.

**Bogdan Alexandru SCHIPOR**, *The Locarno Treaties. Consequences on British Policy in Europe*

Locarno was probably the most important success of British appeasement in the 1920s and appeared to have pleased everybody. The French were satisfied that the Germans admitted having lost Alsace and Lorraine, the Rhineland remained demilitarized, the Eastern European alliances were functional and could continue to exert their dominance on the continent. Italy broke out of diplomatic isolation and seemed to regain its place among the great world powers. The Germans were now protected against a new seizure of the Ruhr, being treated as equals and granted the right to have the situation of their Eastern borders revised. In fact, the Western reconciliation of Germany almost compensated for its foreign policy in the East. There lay the real problem of Europe that all the great powers denied. This attitude is the more obvious in the case of Great Britain, as the Locarno conference turned it into Europe's referee and granted it once more the leading role of striking the right balance in terms of power control on the old continent. Nevertheless, from this position, Great Britain refused to guarantee the Germany Eastern borders. Germany was free to do anything it desired in the East as long as peace was ensured in the West. This can be seen as a reconfirmation and, at the same time, recognition of the fact that Germany had been decisively defeated in the West, in the Great War, but that it was triumphant in the East. Moreover, guaranteeing the German Western borders and the Rhineland was seen by Great Britain only as a moral obligation that would never have to materialize and which could paradoxically prevent any military cooperation with France as long as it remained valid.

Thus Locarno significantly divided the European countries into countries with and without guaranteed borders, whereas the Rhineland guarantee exonerated London from any obligation in Eastern Europe and excluded British involvement in favor of any Eastern European ally of France, much less of any ally of Poland. Moreover, the presence of Moscow in both Locarno and the League of Nations was necessary for ensuring the security and stability of the Central and Eastern European countries. This is the reason why the British diplomacy did not consider the treaties ratified by Poland and Czechoslovakia as tantamount to those ratified by the Western nations. In other words, Great Britain was not ready at that time and under those circumstances to assume any particular obligation towards the Central and Eastern European countries.

**Daniel CITIRIGĂ**, *Federal Temptations: Romanians, Hungarians and Transylvanian Autonomy in Interwar*

The End of The First World War brought an absolutely new reality in Central Europe, following the collapse of the four Empires: German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman. New states sprang on the geopolitical map, but, however, their experience was limited to that from the Middle Ages; any other incumbent to statehood has been lost more than a century ago. The Empires have been divided into several regions. Some of those regions have merged with states that have already enjoyed independence. Taking into consideration this context, we must not be surprised that both during and after the war, Central Europe became the region where the number of federal projects increased.

Transylvania made no exception, since, in 1918, after a long life under Habsburgs, this province was united with Romania. Ideas of federality were not unknown in this region, since debates regarding federalization had a long history during the Dual Monarchy. This work paper concentrates on two aspects: on the one hand, the Romanian leaders from Transylvania agreed to accept provincial autonomy soon after 1918 and, on the other hand, Hungarian leaders from Transylvania promoted and maintained the idea of autonomy during the war even though their reasons and political targets were different from those of the Romanian leaders.

**Florin ANGHEL**, *One relation, two houses: Istanbul and Ankara. The Romanian-Turkish diplomacy at the beginning of the alliance (1927-1928)*

The prerequisite, from which the kemalist regional politics in Balkans was projected, has had in view the impulsion of the reconciliation and co-operation among the South-Eastern European countries. The reasons, extremely rational, in line with the ideal of constructing a modern, European and laic state, have significantly contributed to the shaping of an important regional power towards the end of the Interbellum, which promoted the concept formulated by Atatürk – “Turkey is an element of force and peace within the international family”.

After a mandatory reevaluation of the past and of the perspectives of the bilateral relations, Ankara and Bucharest formulated a sufficiently broaden concept for a longterm politics in Balkans.

**Mioara ANTON**, *Transylvania in the British post-war planning (1942-1946)*

During the years 1942-1943, Transylvania became the object of many analyses by the Foreign Research and Press Service, in which were formulated various scenarios for its postwar

status. Most of them were focused on tracing an ethnic frontier between Romania and Hungary along with a population exchange; the partition of Transylvania and the autonomy of the Szekely districts linked to Hungary by a special corridor; the creation of a separate Transylvanian state as a member of a Danubian union, using the Swiss model; or the organization of an autonomous Transylvania as a buffer state between two federations or confederations expected to be established in Central and South-Eastern Europe after the war.

The change in the course of the war forced the Foreign Research and Press Service to adapt the Transylvanian question to the strategic and military situation resulting after 1944. Consequently, the Soviet Union decided to annul the Vienna Award and restore the Trianon frontier.

**Radu TUDORANCEA**, *The Romanian Communist Elite during the Early 1950's. American unpublished sources*

The present study is focusing on the evaluation of the Romanian Communist elite during the early 1950's, as seen through the eyes of American informative and diplomatic representatives in Bucharest. The architecture of power at the top level of the Romanian Workers Party had been carefully examined by the US Legation in Bucharest, during the late 1940's- and early 1950's, with reports and analysis being sent on a regular basis to Washington. The period which is being taken into consideration has to do with the consolidation of the Communist internal political power within People's Republic of Romania, associated with violent repression and extreme dogmatism. During the above mentioned period, People's Republic of Romania and RWP experienced a long and intense competition for leadership; these evolutions were marked by confrontation and purges which led to the elimination of the Ana Pauker-Vasile Luca-Teohari Georgescu group in 1952 and the entrenchment in power of Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej. The way in which all these evolutions have taken place, the key actors involved and the role of Moscow have been assessed by various US archival documents, shedding new light into a dark period of the Romania's past.

**Gavin BOWD**, *Emanuel de Martone and Communist Romania*

This paper examines the fate of the work of eminent French geographer Emmanuel de Martonne (1873-1955) under and after the Communist regime in Romania. Initially, de Martonne was dismissed as a western imperialist, while some of his pre-war Romanian students were sidelined because of their association with „Fascist” geopolitics. However, with the thaw in relations with the west, particularly France, and the „nationalist” turn of the Communist regime, de Martonne and his Romanian associates were gradually, if not fully, rehabilitated. The head of geography at the University of Cluj, Tiberiu Morariu, would play a key role in these developments. The „return” of De Martonne to his beloved Romania was illustrated by his centenary conference in 1973 and the publication of selected works in translation. The fall of Communism restored complete access to his work. However, changes in the field of geography have undermined the once central position his work enjoyed.

**Paul NISTOR**, *The Union of Plastic Artists and the ideologizing of art in Romania after World War II*

The mechanisms through which art was ideologized in Romania were created following Soviet models, but they were applied under the initiative and control of the Romanian Communist Party. During the 1950s, not much was preserved of the tradition of Romanian art.

A coherent set of norms, commissions, current practices and organizational entities were constituted specifically for directing the entire art towards socialist realism, and for changing the perceptions of the artists. As far as large exhibitions were concerned, they implied imposed themes, especially with a political and social focus. The works were coordinated by the so-called Guidance committees, which rectified the aesthetic deviations from the rigid rules of the Communist East. Grand conferences were organized throughout the country in order to promote the soviet artistic models, as well as the creative act related to the masses, which reflected the “revolutionary” transformations in the country. The magazines published reference articles for ideological and artistic guidance. The Union of Plastic Artists, the only form of professional association of painters, took over the task of “education” and control of the free minds of the artists. Through meetings held with an oppressive precision and through setting stereotypical political programs within the U.P.A groups, the ideology was connected to art, being assigned the main part.

The effect of this strategy, which infested the artistic world with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, was especially obvious in the artistic works and events. The exhibitions displayed works dedicated to the Romanian Communist Party leaders, to Romanian-Russian friendship, to the agrarian and industrial development. But, using the clever “weapon” of art, the images of democracy, of the West and of the national bourgeoisie were attacked, all these being made guilty of a problematic past, or of a tensed present. Among these display of forces there were also transgressions, avoidance of the rules, resistance to the brutal constraints and impositions.

Through passivity and non-participation the artists avoided getting in line with the political ideals of the new regime. Many times the plans for applying the ideology to art looked good only on paper, as they confronted an indifferent reality and with the free human spirit, which manifested disinterest towards the new aesthetic-political doctrines.

**Cristian VASILE**, *The Amateur Art Movement at the beginning of the Ceaușescu regime, 1965-1971*

This paper’s aim is to analyze the various organizational forms which preceded national festival „The Singing of Romania“ (*Cântarea României*), that is choruses, folklore groups, trade unions’ artistic brigades and so on. In the first years of the Ceaușescu regime the amateur performing arts were not a political priority for the leadership of Romanian Communist Party. The governmental authorities initiated legislative projects supporting financially the students’ and trade unions’ artistic brigades, and encouraged various contests and competitions involving amateur artists. I considered 1968 a turning point for the amateur art movement, too, due to various reasons. In the course of the year it is obvious the increasing personality cult; moreover, for the first time Ceaușescu was labeling aggressively those who opposed socialist system calling them *nuts* and promising that they will be punished. On the other hand, in Bucharest numerous students (approx. 2000, according to some sources) publicly showed their christian beliefs on Christmas Eve ignoring (or even manifested against) the official amateur performing artists’ program. In the same time, especially after 1968 the party and governmental authorities has introduced administrative and social structures that encouraged and demanded mass participation within the frame of amateur art movement.

**Ovidiu BOZGAN, „Top-level” Approaches and „gestures of courtesy” between Romania and Vatican during the early years of the Ceausescu regime**

Après l'*aggiornamento* de l'Eglise catholique réalisé par le Concile Vatican II, le lancement de l'Ostpolitik du Saint-Siège et les premiers accords que celui-ci avaient conclus avec différents pays de l'Est (le tout premier étant celui signé en 1964 avec la Hongrie), la prise des contacts entre la Roumanie et le Saint-Siège était inévitable. En effet, des contacts avaient eu lieu entre l'Ambassade roumaine à Rome et la diplomatie pontificale, particulièrement de 1966 à 1968. A Agostino Casaroli lui faisait face l'ambassadeur roumain en Italie, Cornel Burtica, futur ministre et pour une période membre de l'équipe dirigeante de Bucarest, dont l'attitude à l'égard d'une amélioration des rapports entre Vatican et la Roumanie communiste, était très favorable voire enthousiaste. Cependant, l'ambassadeur roumain et encore plus fort que lui, le Saint-Siège lui-même, allaient constater que les responsables de la politique roumaine étaient pour le moins très réservés devant la normalisation des rapports avec le Saint-Siège, angoissés par la probable réouverture d'un grave contentieux qui datait des premiers années de la Guerre Froide, spécialement le dossier de l'Eglise gréco-catholique interdite en 1948. La stratégie du Saint-Siège pendant ces premières années du régime de Nicolae Ceausescu allait se raffiner au fur et à mesure que les discussions avec la partie roumaine s'avançaient pour que la diplomatie pontificale puisse y voir plus clair les limites que Bucarest entendait mettre au dialogue avec le Vatican. Dépasser les appréhensions du régime roumain représentait la première tâche du Vatican qui, pour ce faire, allait déployer une diplomatie des gestes de bienveillance et de séduction, stratégie qu'en principe devait s'avérer payante (la restitution de la copie de la Colonne de Trajan, la faveur avec laquelle le Saint-Siège était prête à traiter la question du rapatriement de la dépouille de l'évêque gréco-catholique Ioan Inocentiu Micu Klein, mort en exil à Rome en 1768). Finalement, cette diplomatie à petits gestes a rapporté des résultats tangibles à l'automne 1968, quand un professionnel de la diplomatie pontificale a pu se rendre en Roumanie.

**Ionuț BUCUR, One Decade of Literary Rivalry: Eugen Barbu and the Media Campaigns of the „Săptămâna“ Magazine, 1970s-1980s**

Eugen Barbu was a complex personality of Romanian literary life, his disposition for controversy and pamphlet bringing him into conflict with most of his fellow guild. The huge talent he displayed with the publication of the novel „The Pit“ was also put into work in the publishing space, Eugen Barbu proving himself as a promoter of a type of journalism that reminded of the leaders of the interwar press. Once he joined the editors of „The Week“, Eugen Barbu opened the way to a series of large scale media campaigns against his rivals in the literary world, drawing a number of dislikes in the Romanian literary sphere. The famous notes, pamphlets and polemics generously hosted by „The Week“ magazine have led to the magazine's fame which was followed with great interest by readers.

In addition to the conflict Eugen Barbu led against „Literary Romania“ magazine, the major scandal which occurred following the reporting of plagiarism in Volume III of Eugen Barbu's „Incognito“ novel was a new challenge in the writer's life, a true turning point. Making himself the evidence of the abovementioned plagiarism, Eugen Barbu, giving away his desire to emigrate to Spain, chose to remain and continue to fight against his rivals, turning the magazine he directed into a stand for scandals, pamphlets, disclosures of private life which, whereas enjoyed by the great mass of readers, was detested by his fellow intellectuals.

**Simion GHEORGHIU, *Romania and the War in Afghanistan from the intervention of the Red Army till its withdrawal (1979-1989)***

The intervention of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in December 1979 surprised the entire world. It was perceived by the rivals of the Soviet Union as a breach of the balance between the two superpowers – USA and USSR, a balance that was based mainly on the mutual annihilation capacity. Regarded as such, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan has contributed to an increase of the tensions between East and West.

Romania wasn't isolated from this tensed environment. Since the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968, Ceausescu's regime has constantly condemned, however with different intensity, dictated by the international context, the interventions of the Superpowers within the internal affairs of other states. Therefore, as a matter of principle, Bucharest couldn't agree with the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that it wasn't as vocal as in 1968, the disagreement between Bucharest and Moscow concerning the Afghan issue manifested under different forms.

After eight years, Ceausescu's position changed radically: from criticism in 1980, yet soft but still to comply with the principle of non-interference within the internal affairs, to the condemnation – behind the closed doors of the Political Executive Committee – of the withdrawal from Afghanistan of the Soviet Army in 1988, seen as a capitulation in front of the American "imperialists". This change in attitude reflected the transition of the Romanian leader from the '60-'70's position of defying USSR to that of searching the support of the Soviet superpower in fighting against the wave of changes that was threatening all the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

**Raul DENIZE, *The evolution of historiography in FRG (1949-1990): tradition, innovation and the quest for normality***

This study presents the evolution of historiography in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1949 and 1990. Immediately after the war, the vast majority of German historians believed that the country's future lay alongside the western democracies. As such, one of their main objectives became distancing themselves from their national-socialist past, leading important historians to emphasize the European dimension of national-socialism. The historical guild (*Zunft*) became dominated by conservative historians, who limited methodological and thematic innovation. Eventually, a series of new historical institutions emerged, but only starting with the 60's did West-German historiography truly begin to follow a new course. The publication of Fritz Fischer's 1961 book *Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914-18* greatly influenced a young generation of German historians who adopted a much more critical stance regarding the German national past. Later, the 70's and 80's were characterised by important innovations, such as the „historical social science” of the Bielefeld School which revolutionized the study of history, as well as the emergence of workshops all around the Federal Republic which made history more accessible to a „lay” audience. Women's history received a lot of attention from renowned historians like Karin Hausen, Heide Wunder, Regina Schulte etc. The interaction of history with other social sciences and the ideas of Clifford Geerts, Natalie Zemon Davis, Hayden White etc. were well received. Finally, if the late 1980's were dominated by the famous *Historikerstreit* and ideas of postnationalism, the Reunification of 1990 made the nation-state reappear on the agenda and „normality” became the word of the hour.

**Steliu LAMBRU**, *History and Theory in Romania, 1960s-1980s*

Marxism in power in East Central Europe meant a significant decrease of interpretative vitality, comparing to its match in Western Europe. Surprisingly, capitalism left enough room to all opponent ideas to be discussed unlike the repressive Soviet Marxism which did quite the opposite. Having in mind Peter Burke's division between historians and social theorists, this essay seeks for explanations in order to understand how deep were disagreements between the two groups. Furthermore, thinking on theory of history, social theorists fulfilled a twofold task: while reflecting on Marxist socio-economic model capabilities, they legitimized the regime's political and cognitive agenda.