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ABSTRACTS

Cosmin POPA, *The Correlation between Borders and Revolution during the early stage of Soviet Doctrine*

Discussion about borders in communism was from the very beginning related to the essence of new-type proletarian state. The debates within the Bolshevik party stopped at the Tenth Party' Congress in 1921, which marked the beginning of the New Economic Policy, focused on defining the new revolutionary context, the basics of revolutionary practice of the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolutionary war, the alliance with the peasantry and the world revolution. Instruments, and the various phases of the revolutionary process and after 1917 have remained a central role in speeches, articles and works Bolshevik leaders, but the old considerations were added and the ongoing reflection on the events, which seemed unspecific for the theoretical schemes of the emigration's period.

The main theoretical innovation of communism in power, in the border issue, according to Lenin, was to transform the territory issue in a secondary matter. The revolution became the main argument in expanding the borders of the communist state. Thus, the borders of the Bolshevik state became one with the territory on which to extend the revolution.

Florin ANGHEL, *Wan Light of Lithuania in Bucharest: The Sources of a non declared Divorce (1918-1926)*

The interwar Romanian diplomacy had missed almost all instruments of analysis and verification of information and expertise offered by the allied capitals in terms of major European geopolitical spaces. In the '30s and '40s of the twentieth century, but even later on, the North - with the Scandinavian countries - and the North-East - with the three Baltic republics that became independent in 1918 - were not the major concern for the objectives and strategies of Bucharest. Usually, Paris and Warsaw offered not only their full reports on the internal policies of these spaces (which they of course interpreted in the light of their own interests) but especially they showed inflexible attitudes and directions, unequivocally, with respect to the regional policy solutions. And often France and Poland had insisted that Romania subordinates its Scandinavian and Baltic weak contacts to a regional complex, aiming to the relationships with / towards Germany and /or Soviet Russia / USSR.

Romanian Foreign Ministers, quite precarious in competences of North and NorthEastern Europe geopolitical spaces, subordinated themselves, with some limited reserves, to the majority of French and/or Polish projects or to those inspired by the so-called policy of "collective security".

The very limited observations that the Romanian diplomacy had used whenever it was about its relationship with Lithuania were due to the lack of first-source information, the lack of imagination in the configuration of normal political and diplomatic relations, to the full ascendant of the Polish diplomacy with respect to the Romanian interests in the North and North-eastern Europe and, last but not least, to the comfortable feeling of doing not much on one's own will. The authorities from Bucharest chose to consider the Baltic region as a marginal one in terms of interest and direction of action and, therefore, they have canceled all strategies, objectives and own means. Only in the late 30's, when it was becoming obvious that there were deep connections and information on the belonging to the same geopolitical space claimed by Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, timid efforts of collaboration and mutual support were initiated. Any glimmer of hope was brutally destroyed in June 1940, with the annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Hertza region to USSR.

Daniel CITIRIGĂ, *Romanian Diplomacy between National State and Federal Central-European Projects (1922-1938)*

Perceptions of the Romanian diplomacy on federal projects were influenced almost exclusively by the interests of Bucharest to maintain the *statu-quo* and the settlements of Treaties of Peace (1919-1920). From this perspective it is noted that favorable perceptions of federalism in Central Europe are practically equivalent to favorable perceptions of geopolitical resetting after the First World War. From our point of view there are two decisive factors on which the Romanian diplomacy approach to supporting federalism and strategic relations with allies federal states: the first would be the need to maintain borders and the second, the relationship with France, which meant development regional security concept, based on the principles of the League of Nations Covenant. In this context, it is mandatory to mention the negative perception against plans that would undermine federalism and sovereignty from the USSR, Eastern neighbor, who became a federation since 1922 and that Romania had a series of political disputes related to the union of Bessarabia, the state treasury, the subversive movement funded by the Comintern.

Alexandru-Murad MIRONOV, *The Failure of the Project of a Non-Aggression Treaty between Romania and the USSR, 1930-1932*

At the end of the third decade of the XXth century, Romanian foreign policy continued to reject from any sort of cooperation with its Eastern neighbor. The rise of German nationalism and the incoming Hitler regime broke the Polish-Romanian alliance against the Soviet Union. Meantime, the Government in Warsaw tried to established better political and economical relations with Moscow. This was done despite the treaty between Romania and Poland, which imposed bilateral consultations in case of future developments of the foreign policy concerning East, and with France putting strong pressure on Bucharest in order to accept the Soviet proposals. This project emphasized the Bessarabia question as a unsolved problem between the two countries, which was totally against the last decade path of the Romanian diplomacy. Fearing international isolation, the National-Peasant Government led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod almost accepted the de facto situation. At that point, the former and future-to-be Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu threatened the Prime Minister with resignation from his diplomatic duty in Geneva, if Soviet project passed. The Government resigned and Nicolae Titulescu become Foreign Minister of Romania. He immediately blocked all negotiations of a non-aggression treaty with the USSR, without recognition of the Union of Bessarabia.

Radu TUDORANCEA, *Ethnic Minorities during Interwar Period: From National Policies to Compulsory Exchange of Population and Massive Voluntary Migration in South-East Europe*

The present paper focuses on the way in which various entities (states, but also international organizations-namely League of Nations) have dealt with sensitive issues such as the rights of minorities or religious freedom, during the interwar decades, in a specific area, namely South-East Europe. Significant steps were taken, in this direction, after the end of World War I, by the states of the above mentioned area, although, in many cases, they tended to elude various legislative provisions or international obligations, by restricting some rights, or by adopting measures designed to control the existing schools and cultural organisations of the ethnic minorities and so on. Other solutions were taken into considerations, such as the compulsory exchange of population, and also massive („in corpore”) migration. At the international level, the League of Nations placed, for the first time, the minorities rights under international protection. Moreover, it has even taken firm steps towards solving potential complaints regarding minorities issues, by establishing a mechanism for dealing with/solving these petitions.

Silviu MILOIU, *The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and Finland: Political, Territorial and Demographic Consequences*

This article aims at re-evaluating in the light of recent archival findings and novel historiographic interpretations the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact – seven decades after its signature – on one of the most seriously affected states by the compromise between the two totalitarian states, Finland. The article approaches Helsinki's choices and politics in this respect from the perspective of Finnish meaning of space and definition of spirituality which, once anchored in public conscience, will play a fundamental role during the interwar and Winter War (Talvisota) period. One of the conclusions of this work is that by their political, territorial and demographic consequences, the Soviet politics with regard to Finland are an example of consequences running contrary to the initial intentions and expectations of a Great Power that gives the impulses in the international relations. Instead of getting extra-security in the Eastern Baltic, the result was the eventual joining of the Finnish Army to the Wehrmacht attack against Soviet Union. The undesirable result of Russian politics in the nineteenth century, the Finnish concept of space has played an important role in the resistance of the Finnish nation when confronting the Soviet political and territorial claims.

Simion GHEORGHIU, *Trotsky's Considerations on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact*

Within the current study we are presenting Lev Trotsky's opinions regarding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact from the 23rd of August 1939 and its place in the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

His comments concerning the conclusion of the understanding between Nazis and Communists have been focused on 3 main directions: 1) Link between the nature of the Soviet State and the Pact; 2) Significance of the Pact from the Soviet Union perspective; 3) Influence of the Pact on the international situation.

Trotsky's texts are taking us to the following conclusions: a) He anticipated even since 1937 the possibility of an agreement between Stalin and Hitler; b) The Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact

didn't alter the labor essence of the Soviet State; c) He didn't condemn the Pact because it avoided the engaging of the Soviet Union into the War; d) Without knowing the Secret Additional Protocol, he realized that the Baltic States, Poland and Romania will be the victims of the Understanding between Berlin and Moscow.

Mioara ANTON, *Behind closed doors: the issue concerning the Romanian claim on the Yugoslav Banat (April 1941)*

At the end of the First World War, the loss of the Serbian part of the Banat region was considered by the Romanian government as a "diplomatic defeat". The question of the Western frontier arose again on the diplomatic agenda in April 1941. The coup d'état in Yugoslavia re-opened very sensitive concerning of the Serbian Banat and the Romanian groups of populations situated south of the Danube. In the event of massive frontier changes in the Balkans, the Romanian government thought that Romania could be one of the beneficiaries of these new territorial arrangements. But the German plans did not include any extension of Romanian frontiers to the South. Once again, the Banat issue remained unsettled and foreign minister Mihai Antonescu could only hope that it would be re-opened in the event of a German victory. The end of the Second World War eliminated these hopes and Bucharest's diplomacy then focussed its efforts on recovering the lost territory of Transylvania.

Cristina DIAC, *PCdR and the Third Congress of Communist International. Informations from „Pătrășcanu Inquiry”*

One of the most important issues of Romanian Communist Party's history during World War II – communication link between local leaders and Comintern – is still in argue. Archive's documents and literature seems to conclude that traditional relation distroid at the beginning of 1941's May was renewed only three years later, in the autumn of 1944. Documents from soviet archives shows a lot of detalis about one unsuccessful attempt, made by soviet part in 1943, to establish new comunicatiios chanell with romanian communists. But romanian archives are in condition to prove a earlier successful attempt: in autumn of 1942 or in spring of 1943, two emissaries sent by Moscow arrived in Bucharest and remited a message to party leader, Ștefan Foriș.

Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, *Suicides within the Top Communist Nomenklatura: The Case of Mirel Costea*

The history of suicides within Communist movement is a fascinating topic. During my presentation on Communism as political religion delivered in June 2010 at the Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism and the Memory of Romanian Exile I mentioned Nikolai Bukharin's worshipping letter to Stalin (December 1937). The letter showed a mystical devotion to communist ideology which pushed the Old Bolshevik Bukharin to prostration towards Stalin who had engineered his downfall and inevitable execution. How does one explain this mental and moral self-debasement?

Following my lecture a friend drew my attention to the similarities between Bukharin's letter and Mirel Costea's last writings. Born in 1907, Mirel Costea (Natan Zeider) was a Jewish Romanian communist militant, head of the Section of Party Cadres Control in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Costea committed suicide in June 1951 after his brother-in-law Emil Calmanovici

was arrested as a traitor, being accused of complicity with Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu. Urged by my friend I decided to publish and comment Costea's letters to his deputy, Alexandru Rogojinschi, to his daughters Dana and Rodica, and to his wife, Ana. These three letters show a sort of „religious commitment“ to the USSR, the Soviet and Romanian Communist Parties and their leaders – Joseph Stalin, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari Georgescu. Costea's suicide was also an occasion for political police (the *Securitate*) and top party leadership to monitor the solidarity gestures showed by his friends, especially former members of International Brigades and French Resistance, Franc Tireurs et Partisans–Main d'Oeuvre Immigrée.

Paul NISTOR, *Communist Romania's Propaganda in USA at the beginning of the Cold War (1950)*

The informing and propaganda activity that the Romanians carried on in America followed a scheme belonging to Soviet traditions (the popularisation of communist ideology, the interest for social actions, establishing contact with groups of leftist leaning) to which a part of purely Romanian interest was attached (publicity for a country that was almost unknown on the American continent, the infiltration of the Romanian colony, the blocking of former political elite's agitation). Within this framework, Romania, as any other Eastern state, wanted to present itself as an evolved form of real democracy. In 1950, this aspect was also helped by the fact that, at least in the Romanian case, white and not black propaganda was preferred and consequently, there was a minimum of credibility regarding the information offered by Romanian diplomats. On paper, the strategies and techniques applied by the diplomats belonging to the P.R.R Legation, looked very good. Their number and diversity is quite impressive. As it has been noted before, the external propaganda, as an indispensable tool of a Communist regime, was “much more calculated, with much more subtle subversion” than the internal one. Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that people who had never before had contacts with the diplomatic milieu, succeeded in establishing links with various American groups. Still, these propaganda activities lacked efficiency. Except the Legation Bulletin, which was printed in thousands of copies, we cannot state that the propaganda through American press, movies or various festivities at the legation headquarters had an important impact.

Cristian VASILE, *The Crisis of Romanian Literature in the 1950s: Ideological Surveillance and Attempts to Challenge the Zhdanovite Canon*

Using a variety of sources – archival materials issued by *Agitprop* and other ideological Departments of the RCP/RWP's Central Committee, Communist newspapers, propaganda texts, diaries, biographies, and works of literary history – the aim of this paper is both to survey the main symptoms of the crisis of Romanian literature in the 1950s and to follow the writers' failure to support a revisionist movement within the Communist Party which would be able to generate revolts and revolutions such as in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

In the first postwar years – mainly 1946 and 1947 – there were heated debates over the concept of *crisis* (“crisis of culture”). One of the most important poets, Tudor Arghezi has argued convincingly that the writers were the first entitled to discuss the problems of literary history, including the issues raised by the use of the term *crisis of culture*. Arghezi denied politicians' role in such debates and, as a consequence, he was the victim of 1948 communist media lynch directed by the propaganda Czars Iosif Chișinevschi and Leonte Răutu through their proxy – „Scântea“ editor-in-chief Sorin Toma.

In 1948 the communist officials violently settled the dispute through censorship. Therefore, the term *crisis* was prohibited; the literature crisis could spread only to the decadent Western Europe and United States, as communist propaganda had decided. Moreover, the only style allowed for writers was the Socialist Realism (that is the Zhdanovite canon). The first attempts to contest and challenge this Soviet method of literature appeared after the death of Stalin. Prominent writer such as G. Călinescu published a novel which did not entirely follow the propaganda directives. On the other hand, especially in 1956 Alexandru Jar, an interwar communist activist and typically Socialist Realist novelist until 1953, denounced the *Agitprop* intimidation campaign to stifle the writers' freedom of expression. Literary critic and esthetician László Földes, an ethnic Hungarian and editor-in-chief of literary magazine „Utunk“, acted in the same way and expressed his empathy with the ideas of 1956 Hungarian Revolution. But in 1956 the intellectual community was disunited and divided also due to ethnic reasons. Jar was perceived as an old Stalinist writer who do not deserve a gesture of solidarity. Moreover, Földes was denounced by his Hungarian peers from a rival magazine based in Târgu Mureș, the second cultural center of the Romanian Hungarians.

Cezar STANCIU, *Romania and the „friendly countries“, from apparent unity to „de facto“ scission (1957-1960)*

From 1957 to 1960 the Gheorghiu-Dej regime in Romania embarked on a cautious path to consolidation. Reducing its vulnerability through accelerated industrial development was a key feature in the regime's optic. Romania's position in the “socialist camp” remained faithful to Moscow's directives, trying to save the appearances and protect itself from Soviet suspicion. Nevertheless, as soon as the developmental policies under way in Romania were endangered by the principle of “specialization”, the regime did not hesitate in assuming an oppositionist attitude. Debates about the principle of “specialization” which took place in 1960 revealed Gheorghiu-Dej's resistance to outside pressure and Romania's disagreements with other “peoples' democracies”, like GDR and Czechoslovakia.

Florin MÜLLER, *Nae Ionescu: Landmarks of the Anti-Democratic Political Thought*

In the context of the ideological civil war in the 1930's Romania, the political theories elaborated by Nae Ionescu rejoice a special impact and political visibility. Nae Ionescu has been considered a real “conscience leader” by the cultural media of the rightwing generation, a generation that will later find themselves, under different shapes and at different paces, in the ranks of the Legionary Movement. Nae Ionescu is politically, morally and intellectually contested with the same virulence by both the rationalist and the (extreme) left-wing group (Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, but also Tudor Vianu or Mihail Ralea); the study elaborates a theory of the political rationality, as a vector of modernity and democracy; reading Nae Ionescu's political texts reveal the radical contestation by the philosopher of this configuration, by invoking the lack of legitimacy of the democratic political parties by de-legitimizing the philosophies and forms of civilization belonging to the democratic modernity. In spite of this, being a *modern* himself, Nae Ionescu does not participate in a straight line to the political and intellectual emergency of fascism and totalitarianism.